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UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW: BANK PROHIBITED
FROM PROVIDING ESTATE ANALYSIS SERVICE
The Ohio Supreme Court enjoined a national bank from provid-
ing "estate analysis" reports to prospective customers on the ground
that this program involved the giving of legal advice by a lay
institution. The decision affords salutary protection to the rele-
vant public and professional interests which underlie the prohibi-
tion against the unauthorized practice of law.
17STATE PLANNING has developed in recent years into a spe-
J2 Icialized service, largely because of the increasing intricacy of
applicable tax law1 and the growing demand for specialization
wrought by societal complexity. Its general purpose is the orderly
arrangement of a person's assets so as to provide effectively for his
own economic needs during his lifetime and for the needs of his
dependents after his death.2 While the actual drafting of the requi-
site testamentary or trust instruments is now generally conceded to
be the sole responsibility of the independent attorney, there is far
See McLucas, Relations of Banks with the Bar, 30 UNAUTHOPZED PRACTI CE NEws
189, 194 (1964); 39'N.Y.U.L. Rav. 364-65 (1964). For example, the 1948 Internal
Revenue Act included a new provision entitling the estate of a taxpayer to deduct
property passing to a surviving spouse in an amount up to one half of the adjusted
gross estate. INT. REv. CoDE oF 1954, § 2056. This "marital deduction" provision
has introduced a multitude of considerations into the task of the estate planner who
must now concern himself with the complex questions of whether and how to
take the marital deduction. See generally TRACHTMAN, ESTATE PLANNING 12-67 (1964).2 American Bar Association Committee on Unauthorized Practice of the Law,
Opinion 1959-A: Estate Planning, 45 A.B.A.J. 1296 (1959). Estate planning involves
several steps: collection of full information about a client's affairs; analysis of a
client's assets in terms of his own needs and those of his dependents and other
intended beneficiaries; formulation of an integrated estate plan; and drafting of any
necessary instruments as well as supervision over any other changes in the client's
legal status pursuant to an implementation of the estate plan.
3 See Arkansas Bar Ass'n v. Union Nat'l Bank, 224 Ark. 48, 56-57, 273 S.W.2d
408, 413 (1954); Hobson v. Kentucky Trust Co., 303 Ky. 493, 505, 197 S.W.2d 454,
461, (1946); People v. Peoples Trust Co., 180 App. Div. 494, 167 N.Y. Supp. 767
(1917); State ex rel. Miller v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 335 Mo. 845, 860, 868, 74
S.W.2d 348, 354, 359 (1934); National Conference Group, Statements of Principles
with Respect to the Practice of Law: Banks with Trust Functions, reprinted in 3
MARTINDALE-HUBBELL, LAW DiRECTORY 190A (1966). Contra, Merrick v. American
Sec. & Trust Co., 107 F.2d 271, 277 (D.C. Cir. 1939) (trust agreements); Cain
v. Merchants Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 66 N.D. 746, 754-55, 268 N.W. 719, 723-24 (1936)
(isolated instances of drafting); Umble's Estate, 117 Pa. Super. 15, 177 Atl. 340 (1985)
(preparation of only one will). A trust institution has been permitted to draft
revocable, non-donative, and non-testamentary trust agreements. See, e.g., Detroit
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less agreement as to the line of demarcation between the respective
roles of the lawyer and the trust officer in the vital analysis-and-
planning phrase of estate practice.4 Yet this distinction must be
made and recognized since performance by the trust officer of duties
considered to be the function of the attorney constitutes the un-
authorized practice of law.5
This bank-bar conflict was the issue in the recent Ohio Supreme
Court case of Green v. Huntington Nat'l Bank.6 The bank,
authorized by the Federal Reserve Board to act in various fiduciary
capacities, 7 solicited inquiries from the general public about its trust
and estate business and requested prospective customers to submit
specific data concerning assets, family, and preferences concerning
the course of property disposition at death.8 This data, after being
examined, was "plugged into" certain standard trust provisions se-
Bar Ass'n v. Union Guardian Trust Co., 282 Mich. 216, 228-29, 276 N.W. 365, 869
(1937); 107 U. PA. L. Rav. 398, 400 (1959).
4 The creation of a comprehensive estate plan is likely to require a working
knowledge of the law of real and personal property, wills and decedents' estates,
trusts and future interests, partnerships and corporations, federal and state taxation,
and probate practice. Stressing this fact, the American Bar Association has taken
the position that, except for general analysis and discussion, problems in this area
demand the special competence of the outside, licensed attorney. American Bar
Association Committee on Unauthorized Practice of the Law, supra note 2, at 1296.
On the other hand, trust institutions have called attention to their skills and have
urged recognition of their legitimate interest in the formative stage of estate planning
as an integral part in the successful prosecution of their trust business.
5Recognizing the inability of the layman to deal effectively with legal problems,
the early common law evolved restrictions designed to insure that those who argued
cases in the courts and those who advised the public as to legal matters would be
qualified to do so by education and experience. See PoTTR, HisroxcAL INTROOUcrMoN
TO ENGLISH LAW AND rrs INsTrruTIoNs 82-86 (4th ed. 1958). See generally 1 POLLOCK
& MArrnAND, THE HIsToRY OF ENGUSH LAw 210-218 (2d ed. 1898). As licensing pro-
cedures were used to regulate qualifications for lawyers, there developed a corre-
sponding prohibition against practice of law by the unlicensed. Today, statutes
and/or court rules in all states forbid the unauthorized practice of law by laymen
and corporations. See notes 14, 17 infra. For a helpful survey of the origin and
development of the legal profession and of the unauthorized practice proscription,
see vor Baur, An Historical Sketch of the Unauthorized Practice of Law, Unauthor-
ized Practice News, Fall 1958, p. 1.
0 4 Ohio St. 2d 78, 212 N.E.2d 585 (1965).7 In 1922 the Federal Reserve Board, pursuant to statutory authority, authorized
the defendant bank to act as trustee, executor, administrator, guardian, assignee and
receiver where the exercise of such powers was not in conflict with state or local
law and to act in any other fiduciary capacity which competing corporations were
allowed to assume by the laws of Ohio. See Act of Sept. 26, 1918, ch. 117, § 2 (k),
40 Stat. 968 (cited in Green as 12 U.S.C. § 248 (k) (1958)), repealed by Act of Sept. 28,
1962, § 3, 76 Stat. 670. This authorizing function was transferred from the Federal
Reserve Board to the Comptroller of the Currency in 1962. Act of Sept. 28, 1962,
§ 1 (a), 76 Stat. 668, 12 U.S.C. § 92a (a) (1964).
8Brief for Appellant, p. 2; Brief for Appellee, pp. 4-5.
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lected and adapted to accord with the prospect's circumstances and
needs. Theresult was sent to the prospect in the form of an "estate
analysis" report containing estimates of federal and state tax liabil-
ity, suggestions as to the form of asset ownership, and an indication
of possible savings for the prospect if the bank's suggestions were
implementedY Consultation with an attorney for the actual "plan-
ning" and the drafting of legal documents was strongly recom-
mended.10 The bank made no charge for this service; its intention,
however, was to induce the prospect to engage in estate planning
with the bank as fiduciary."
The plaintiffs, members of the unauthorized practice of law com-
mittee of the state bar association,'12 succeeded in enjoining the bank
from continuing the estate analysis program 13 on the grounds that
'Brief for Appellant, pp. 2-3. See Brief for Appellee, pp. 6-12.
20 4 Ohio St. 2d at 81-82, 212 N.E.2d at 588. Since the practice of law encom-
passes the giving of legal advice (a necessary and implied element in the formula-
tion of an estate plan), Land Title Abstract & Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St.
23, 28, 193 N.E. 650, 652 (1934), and the preparation of legal instruments, Judd v.
City Trust & Say. Bank, 133 Ohio St. 81, 87, 12 N.E.2d 288, 291 (1937), these
services must be performed by an attorney under Ohio law. See note 17 infra.
114 Ohio St. 2d at 81, 212 N.E.2d at 587.
2 Nearly every state bar organization today has a special committee dealing with
the practice of law by laymen and lay institutions. Organized efforts to combat
unauthorized practice began in the 1910-1915 period which saw the creation of the
first unauthorized practice committees by the Chicago and New York City bar asso-
ciations. Increased awareness of the scope of this problem and the threat it posed
led to the establishment in 1930 of the Committee on the Unauthorized Practice of
Law by the American Bar Association. Otterbourg, A 1960 Resumd: Unauthorized
Practice of the Law, 46 A.BA.J. 46, 47 (1960). A few years later the American Bar
Association began publication of a periodical, the Unauthorized Practice News, to
focus attention on lay activities in the traditional domain of the licensed attorney.
The elimination of unauthorized practice has maintained a high priority in the
programs of the national and state bar organizations. One fruit of this continuing
campaign has been the institution of legal proceedings (or the submission of amicus
curiae briefs in suits by other plaintiffs), with the usual objective being to obtain an
injunction in order to stop or discourage the alleged practice of law by lay institu-
tions or persons. See note 13 infra. The most frequent defendants in these actions
(indicating the predominant areas of controversy) have included accountants and
notaries, title companies, realtors, collection agencies, insurance companies, unions,
and corporate fiduciaries. A collection of unauthorized practice cases through 1965
is contained in AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE SOURCE BOOK (rev.
ed. 1965).
13 The Court of Common Pleas dismissed the plaintiff's petition, finding that no
specific advice had been given and that the plaintiffs, in showing only that the bank
had disseminated general information and suggestions as an incident to its authorized
fiduciary practice, had failed to sustain the burden of proving unlawful engagement
in the practice of law. Green v. Huntington Nat'l Bank, No. 207, Franklin County Ct.
C.P., Aug. 1962. The Ohio Court of Appeals reversed and held that while the reason-
able use of illustrations analogous to a prospect's situation in an estate analysis
presentation was unoffensive, .the providing of specific legal information relating to spe-
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it involved the unauthorized practice of law.14 In upholding the
injunction, the Ohio Supreme Court defined the practice of law as
the repeated giving of legal advice to others with the expectation
of receiving compensation. 15 In the estate practice context, the
court determined that the providing of specific legal information
concerning the specific facts of an individual estate constituted the
giving of legal advice,16 a service which the bank as a lay institution
could not lawfully offer or hold itself out as offering.17 The injunc-
cific facts, which the court found to have occurred in the instant case, constituted the
practice of law. Green v. Huntington Nat'l Bank, 3 Ohio App. 2d 62, 209 N.E.2d 228
(1964). Consequently, the bank was enjoined from "offering or providing to any person
who seeks information or assistance in the analysis or planning of an estate, specific
legal information in relation to the specific facts of a particular estate [and] . . .
from offering or providing specific comments or advice on the form of investments
or on the management of assets in a particular estate, for the purpose of obtaining
for a particular person . . . a more beneficial estate condition in relation to the
tax and other consequences of death upon such estate." Green v. Huntington Nat'l
Bank, No. 7209, Franklin County Ct. C.P., Aug. 11, 1964. The bank was also
prohibited by injunction from soliciting inquiry concerning such services. Ibid.
'4All fifty states have statutes controlling the practice of law. This legislation
ranges in character from the general "integration acts" limiting the practice of law
to members of the bar, to statutes laying down definitions either of the practice of
law or of unauthorized practice. All such legislation is helpfully compiled and.
classified in AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE STATUTE BooK (1961).
See also Otterbourg, A Study of Unauthorized Practice of Law, Unauthorized Practice
News, Sept. 1951, p. 1 at 61-72. Criminal penalties are the most common statutory
remedy afforded, with the practice of law by an unauthorized person constituting a
misdemeanor. See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 4-3602 (1946); OHIo RFV. CODE ANN.
§ 4705.99 (Page Supp. 1965). The most effective remedy, however, has been the in-
junction, restricting or prohibiting future acts. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 51-88 (1960); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-37 (1965). A variety of other forms of statutory
and non-statutory judicial relief have been used, among which are the quo warranto
proceeding, civil or criminal contempt of court decree, judicial inquiry, declaratory
judgment or advisory opinion, writ of prohibition, and award of damages for negli-
gence. See AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE SOURCE BOOK 19-44
(rev. ed. 1965); Sanders, Procedures for the Punishment or Suppression of Unauthor-
ized Practice of Law, 5 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 135 (1938); Note, 62 COLUM. L. Rrv.
501 (1962).
Though there has been some conflict in the decisions, the judicial branch of
government has generally been accorded the primary responsibility for defining and
regulating legal practice, with the legislature recognized as performing a supple-
mentary role. See, e.g., Hoffmeister v. Tod, 349 S.W.2d 5, 11 (Mo. 1961) (en banc)
(legislature may aid court by penalizing unauthorized practice but cannot interfere
with the court's inherent power); West Virginia State Bar v. Earley, 144 W. Va. 504,
529-35, 109 S.E.2d 420, 436-39 (1959) (regulation inherently a judicial function).
Cf. Barr v. Watts, 70 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 1953) (concurrent function); Detroit Bar
Ass'n v. Union Guardian Trust Co., 282 Mich. 216, 225-28, 276 N.W. 365, 368-69 (1937)
(separate judicial and legislative responsibilities with some areas of concurrence). See
AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE STATUTE BOOK 1-5 (1962).
'5 4 Ohio St. 2d at 81, 212 N.E.2d at 587.
'Old. at 80-81, 212 N.E.2d at 587.
17 Legislation in Ohio prohibits anyone who has not been admitted to the bar
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tion contained the proviso, however, that it was permissible for the
bank to disclose its recommendations, specific or otherwise, to coun-
sel for a prospective trust customer.'8
In prior cases in which this or a related issue has arisen, several
tests have been resorted to as means of distinguishing the sphere of
permissible estate practice from that of the practice of law. For
example, where preliminary information of a legal nature given to
trust department customers is merely a service "incidental" to a
bank's trust business, no unauthorized practice of law will result.""
by order of the Ohio Supreme Court from practicing law or conducting litigation in
which he is not a party. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4705.01 (Page 1954). A fine or
imprisonment may be imposed on any unlicensed person holding himself out as
authorized to practice law. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4705.99 (Page Supp. 1954).
These provisions have been enforced against corporations, which are unable by
definition to satisfy the "personal" requirements for admission to the bar. Land
Title Abstract & Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 29-30, 193 N.E. 650, 653
(1934). Ohio is among the states which acknowledge broad judicial power in the
governance of unauthorized practice. See note 14 supra; Note, 33 U. CINe. L. Rv.
401-06 (1964).
1114 Ohio St. 2d at 83, 85, 212 N.E.2d at 588, 590. The injunction of the court
of apeals was further modified by the elimination of the prohibition concerning
advice on the management of investments and assets, see note 13 supra, on the
grounds that such activity may or may not fall within the proscription against
unauthorized practice and that any illegal aspects were adequately encompassed by
.the rest of the judgment. 4 Ohio St. 2d at 84, 212 N.E.2d at 589. See Brief for
Appellant, pp. 6-7.
"' Merrick v. American Sec. & Trust Co., 107 F.2d 271, 276-77 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
Central to this concept is the idea that an activity which is "incidental" is both
subordinate to and intimately connected with the primary, legitimate business of
the lay person or corporation.
The "incidental services" doctrine has had currency in other areas of unauthorized
practice controversy, see e.g., Ingham County Bar Ass'n v. Walter Neller Co., 342
Mich. 214, 228-30, 69 N.W.2d 713, 719-21 (1955) (conveyancing by real estate broker),
and has been advanced particularly to justify certain practices of corporate fiduciaries,
see, e.g., Merrick v. American Sec. & Trust Co., supra at 273 (handling of uncontested
probate matters; preparation of trust agreements using standard forms); Judd v.
City Trust & Say. Bank, 133 Ohio St. 81, 89-94, 12 N.E.2d 288, 292-94 (1937) (ap-
pearances in probate court; drafting of papers incident to administration of trust).
The theory by which these acts are deemed lawful is that the practice of law
necessarily implies the rendering of services for another, and that in the administra-
tion of a trust or estate the fiduciary is acting primarily for itself. See Judd v.
City Trust & Say. Bank, supra at 89-94, 12 N.E.2d at 292-93. Other courts and
commentators have criticized the soundness of the second step in this syllogistic
reasoning, arguing that a fiduciary is, by any proper interpretation, acting on behalf
of the beneficiaries of a trust (or devisees of an estate) and therefore can be guilty
of practicing law. See Arkansas Bar Ass'n v. Union Nat'l Bank, 224 Ark. 48, 51-52,
273 S.W.2d 408, 410-11 (1954); 43 MINN. L. Rav. 827, 829-30 (1959); 32 So. CAL. L.
Rav. 425, 427-28 (1959).
Even when recognized as valid, the incidental services doctrine is subject to certain
limitations: A lay person or corporation may not delve into any matter involving a
complex issue of law. Gardner v. Conway, 234 Minn. 468, 480-81, 48 N.W.2d 788
795-96 (1951). A bank may perform such services incidental to its fiduciary business
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Such activity is viewed as being merely concomitant to the prospec-
tive and authorized employment of the bank as fiduciary and hence
is not considered a part of the practice of law.20 However, in a
number of jurisdictions, where the services, although incidental, are
rendered for compensation, the court may find the transaction un-
lawful.21
as filing various trust and estate applications, petitions, accounts, inventories and
distributions in a probate court and as preparing tax returns, so long as such con-
duct does not involve problems the resolution of which would commonly be regarded
as constituting the practice of law. State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co.,
146 Conn. 556, 563-64 n.3, 153 A.2d 453, 457 n.3 (1959), modifying 21 Conn. Supp.
42, 144 A.2d 347 (Super. Ct. 1958) on remand from 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863
(1958). Finally, while some courts would permit a realtor to draft an instrument
conveying land in the course of his business, they would extend this Tight only to
include mere clerical entries on "simple documents." See 17 ALA. L. REv. 360, 366
(1965) and cases cited. But see Clark v. Reardon, 231 Mo. App. 666, 670-71, 104
S.W.2d 407, 410 (1937), rejecting any test based on a "simple-complex instrument"
distinction.
The characterization of acts as "incidental services" is also important in a juris-
diction exempting certain such services from the scope of its unauthorized practice
ban. See e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:170-81 (a) to -81 (c) (1953).
.'Merrick v. American Sec. & Trust Co., supra note 19, at 274-77.
"The element of compensation is sometimes included in the statutory definition
of unauthorized practice. The statute in force in Missouri proscribing unauthorized
practice, Mo. ANN. STAT. § 484.020 (1949), incorporates by reference another section
defining "law business" as the "advising or counseling for a valuable consideration of
any person, firm, association, or corporation as to any secular law or the drawing
or procuring of or assisting in the drawing for a valuable consideration of any paper,
document or instrument affecting or relating to secular rights." Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 484.010.2 (1949). (Emphasis added.) In this jurisdiction a real estate broker was
permitted to prepare simple trust deed and general warranty deed forms in closing
transactions on an "incidental service" rationale, but with the caveat that the charg-
ing of any separate fee would convert them into the unauthorized practice of law.
Hulse v. Criger, 363 Mo. 26, 43-44, 247 S.W.2d 855, 861 (1952). See Paul v. Stanley,
168 Wash. 371, 12 P.2d 401 (1932). In several cases, the court itself has injected the
requirement that compensation be found before any sanction be imposed on a layman
for performing occasional or "incidental" legal services. See In re Eastern Idaho Loan
& Trust Co., 49 Idaho 280, 286, 288 P. 157, 159 (1930); In re Opinion of the Justices,
289 Mass. 607, 615, 194 N.E. 313, 317 (1935); Fitchette v. Taylor, 191 Minn. 582,
584, 254 N.W. 910, 911 (1934); Cain v. Merchants Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 66 N.D.
746, 752-53, 268 N.W. 719, 722-23 (1936). If not a per se incriminating factor,
compensation may be accorded evidentiary weight as showing that the legal services
in question were not merely ancillary to some primary and lawful activity but
rendered, in the view of the parties, as part of a separate business or occupation.
See Merrick v. American Sec. & Trust Co., supra note 19, at 276 n.19; State ex rel.
Fatzer v. Schmitt, 174 Kan. 581, 585-86, 258 P.2d 228, 233-34 (1953). As the court of
appeals in Green recognized, payment of a fee may also serve the purpose of raising the
transaction above a de minimis level, thereby making it of "sufficient [importance]
to warrant legal repression." 3 Ohio App. 2d at 64-65, 209 N.E.2d at 230.
Whether given application as a statutory or court-imposed criterion, the element
of consideration or compensation has been broadly construed to encompass any
direct or indirect economic benefit, such as the appointment of a bank or trust
company as fiduciary. See State ex rel. Miller v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 335 Mo.
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Another criterion to delimit the area of unauthorized practice
was suggested in a recent Oregon case 22 with a factual situation
closely analogous to that in Green.2 3 There the court reasoned that
the estate planning advice furnished to customers of defendant cor-
poration required the application of legal principles in more than
an insubstantial way and therefore constituted the practice of law.
2 4
Under this test, even though the services are "incidental" to a law-
ful business, a violation will presumably occur if they are deemed
substantial in nature.
Finally, the specific-general information dichotomy achieved in
Green is not itself without supporting authority. The American
Bar Association's Committee on Unauthorized Practice excluded
from its characterization of allowable estate practice for laymen the
"specific application [of laws affecting estate disposition] . . . to a
particular estate or individual situation." 25
845, 860, 74 S.W.2d 348, 354 (1934) (statute defined law business as necessarily
including receipt of valuable consideration). Moreover, this benefit may be identified
in the total commission or profit received for the entire transaction, of which the
legal service itself was a minor but integral part. See Hill, Real Estate Brokers and
the Courts, 5 LAw & CONTEMP. PROn. 72, 76-77 (1938).
2 Oregon State Bar v. John H. Miller S. Co., 235 Ore. 341, 385 P.2d 181 (1963).
"Defendants in the Miller case were a corporation, Executive Estate Planners,
and its president who had been offering a financial and estate planning service to
customers. Company salesman solicited inquiries as to this service, which consisted
of an estate analysis suggesting the employment of various legal devices such as use
of the marital deduction and inter vivos and testamentary trusts to minimize tax
liability. Id. at 343-44, 385 P.2d at 181-82. The individual defendant unsuccessfully
contended that this advice was merely incidental to his primary business of selling
insurance. Ibid.
2 
"d. at 344-45, 385 P.2d at 182-83. Other courts have advanced similar definitional
criteria. An Illinois court approved a concept of the practice of law which included
extra-court services such as the dissemination of advice requiring the use of any
legal skills or knowledge. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Financial Planning, Inc., Case No.
53-S 10001, Ch., Super. Ct. Cook County, March 1, 1958 (reported in Unauthorized
Practice News, June 1958, p. 29). The court's injunction was issued to prohibit the
preparation of confidential financial reports comprising "an elaborate and detailed
program for the devolution of the estate of the customer." Id. at 31. In another suit,
a Kentucky court applied a judicial definition of the practice of law promulgated
pursuant to statutory authorization: the practice of law is any service consisting of
legal advice or knowledge communicated for the consideration and in respect to rights,
duties, obligations, and liabilities of the party requesting such service. Hobson v.
Kentucky Trust Co., 303 Ky. 493, 497, 197 S.W.2d 454, 457 (1946).
2"American Bar Association Committee on Unauthorized Practice of the Law,
supra note 2, at 1296. Cases dealing with acts of trust companies in general as the
practice of law are collected in Annot., 69 A.L.R.2d 404 (1960).
Other judicial referents have been suggested by which to distinguish the practice
of law from permissible lay business: an unlicensed person may not perform any
acts "commonly understood to be the practice of law," State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut
Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 234, 236, 140 A.2d 863, 870, 871 (1958), modifying
[Vol. 1966:11461152 DUKE LAW JOURNAL
Vol. 1966: 1146] UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW 1153
Critics of the bar have charged that the application of these
various tests to proscribe unauthorized practice has been motivated
by a desire to preserve a lucrative monopoly over an employment
which could adequately be discharged in part by lay specialists. 2 6
While a concern for the protection of the financial and professional
integrity of the bar is undoubtedly one motivating factor (though
usually an unarticulated one) for the restrictions placed around
legal practice 27 the predominant objective is protection of the pub-
lic. 28 The exclusion from legal practice of those who have not met
the bar's requirements of education and character is designed to
guarantee the public a reasonable level of competence and a high
standard of ethical reliability.29 A client is assured that the advice
he receives from his attorney is derived solely from consideration
of his best interests, since the attorney must not only pass moral
character scrutiny to gain admission to the bar but after admission
is bound by a code of professional conduct prescribing undivided
loyalty to the client by whom he is retained. 0
20 Conn. Supp. 248, 131 A.2d 646 (Super. Ct. 1957); see People v. Title Guar. &
Trust Co., 227 N.Y. 366, 125 N.E. 666 (1919). Public convenience may validate
certain conveyandng and legal advice provided by laymen. Conway-Bogue Realty Inv.
Co. v. Denver Bar Ass'n, 135 Colo. 398, 417-18, 312 P.2d 998, 1007 (1957); Cowern
v. Nelson, 207 Minn. 642, 647, 290 N.W. 795, 797 (1940). Contra, Hexter Title &
Abstract Co. v. Grievance Comm., 142 Tex. 506, 519-20, 179 S.W.2d 946, 953 (1944).
For an excellent treatment of the various principles utilized by the courts in deciding
unauthorized practice cases, see Johnstone, The Unauthorized Practice Controversy, A
Struggle Among Power Groups, 4 KAN. L. REv. 1, 6-22 (1955). See generally Hicks
& Katz, The Practice of Law by Laymen and Lay Agencies, 41 YALE L.J. 69, 71 (1931);
Comment, 2 S.D.L. REv. 104 (1957); Note, 26 FoRDHAm L. REv. 163 (1957).
2' See Hicks & Katz, supra note 25, at 71; Note, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 126, 134 (1959).
2 See Llewellyn, The Bar's Troubles, and Poultices-and Cures?, 5 LAw & CON-
TEMp. PROB. 104, 109-14 (1938); 48 A.B.A.J. 99 (1962); 35 OIo BAR 229, 230 (1962).
28 "The bar arose out of a public demand for the exclusion of those who assumed
to practice law without adequate qualifications therefor." Rhode Island Bar Ass'n v.
Automobile Serv. Ass'n, 55 R.I. 122, 133-34, 179 Ad. 139, 144 (1935). See, e.g.,
Resh, The Bar's Duty to Prevent Unauthorized Practice, 30 UNAUTHORIZED PRACrscE
Nnws 177, 187 (1964); Note, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 126, 128 (1959); 9 ViLL. L. REv. 353,
354 (1964). Unauthorized practice statutes find their legitimation as measures de-
signed to protect the public enacted under the state's police powers. See State ex rel.
Miller v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 335 Mo. 845, 865, 74 S.W.2d 348, 357 (1934).
In 1940 the American Bar Association announced, through its Committee on
Unauthorized Practice of Law, that it would institute proceedings against unauthor-
ized practice violators only if "it can be clearly shown that such practice in the
given case is resulting in injury to the public," and never solely to protect the
economic interests of the profession. 26 A.B.A.J. 104 (1940).
2 Johnstone, supra note 25, at 17; see, e.g., Bump v. District Court, 232 Iowa
623, 639, 5 N.W.2d 914, 922 (1942).
30 "It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express consent
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To the extent that safeguards against public injury similar to
those afforded by the legal profession are absent in the setting of
lay estate planning services, there are grounds for the imposition of
unauthorized practice sanctions. Certainly it is important that the
trust officer is not subject to a binding ethical code comparable to
of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning of
this canon, a lawyer represents conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it
is his duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires him to oppose."
American Bar Association, Canon of Professional Ethics 6. See AMERICAN BAR Asso-
CIATION, OPINIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS & GRIEVANCES 3-7 (rev.
ed. 1957) (hereinafter cited as ABA OPINIONS).
The force of the canons and their state bar association counterparts may vary
in different jurisdictions. In some states these ethics regulations have been adopted
by statute or by rules of the highest court and hence possess the full impact of law.
See, e.g., Hexter Title & Abstract Co. v. Grievance Comm., 142 Tex. 506, 510-12,
179 S.W.2d 946, 947-49 (1944) (statute empowered Texas Supreme Court to prepare
code of ethics to govern professional conduct of attorneys); RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE following § 6076, at 405-27. A number of canons
are buttressed by the fact that violation of the duty therein articulated would render
the offending attorney liable to punishment under common law rules developed by
court decisions. For example, the duty not to disclose confidential communications
from a client (American Bar Association, Canon of Professional Ethics 37) was well
established at an early date in English law. 6 HoIwswoRm, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAw 433 (1927). Or, the contravention of a canon may at the same time be con-
sidered a violation of public policy or breach of duty toward the court, either of
the latter grounds being itself sufficient to warrant an adjudication adverse to the
attorney. See, e.g., Duffy v. Colonial Trust Co., 287 Pa. 348, 135 At. 204 (1926).
Even where no primary authority is accorded the canons, they are of persuasive
effect as evidence of the standard of conduct considered obligatory by the profession.
See DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 26-27, 30 (1953) and cases cited therein.
The duties specified in the national or local bar association rules of conduct are
frequently enforced by disciplinary proceedings initiated upon a breach and con-
ducted according to the rules of each state. See DRINKER, op. cit. supra at 34-42 for a
summary description of such proceedings. These proceedings may result in permanent
disbarment, suspension, or public or private censure. See PHILLIPS & McCoy, CON-
DUCT OF JUDGES AND LAWYERS 94, 101, 116 (1952).
In Ohio, the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals or Court of Common Pleas is
authorized to suspend or remove an attorney or reprimand him for "misconduct or
unprofessional conduct in office involving moral turpitude ...... OHIO REv. COn
ANN. § 4705.02 (Page 1954). Moreover, the judges of such state courts are required
to institute disciplinary proceedings against an attorney whose misconduct becomes
known to them. Ibid. The term "moral turpitude" includes any conduct by an
attorney contrary to the ethical code of his profession. In re McBride, 164 Ohio St.
419, 424-25, 132 N.E.2d 113, 116 (1956) (dictum). There is, in addition, an inherent
power in the supreme court and court of appeals to disbar for grounds broader
than those specified by statute. See In re McBride, supra at 424, 132 N.E.2d at 116-18;
In re Strong, 29 Ohio C.C. Dec. 81 (1917); cf. In re Lieberman's Disbarment, 163
Ohio St. 35, 125 N.E.2d 328 (1955). The Supreme Court of Ohio has published
rules of practice under statutory authority. Rule 19 deals with professional conduct
and is declared to be "binding upon all members admitted to practice law in the
State of Ohio" upon pain of reprimand, suspension or disbarment for any violation.
OHIO Sup. CT. R. 19. Five of the eight rules of professional conduct deal with the
conflict of interest problem, § 6 forbidding the representation of conflicting interests
except by consent of the client. OHIO Sup. Cr. R. 19 (6).
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that of the licensed attorney.31 In addition, since the primary loyal-
ty of the trust officer is to his corporate employer, a very real danger
exists that the prospect will not receive truly disinterested advice in
an estate analysis report or similar communication. 32 On the other
hand, the preparatory training and intensive experience of the aver-
age trust officer in this concentrated area results in an expertise
which may surpass that of the average attorney, for whom estate
planning is only one of many areas of professional responsibility 3
The fact that a trust institution is dependent for its business on
the confidence and good will of the community may serve to miti-
gate the danger of advice slanted more toward its own interests than
toward those of its prospective customer.3 4 The employment by
31 It is not suggested that no ethical standards have been adopted for lay trust
officers. See A Statement of Principles of Trust Institutions, 57 TRUST COMPANIES
411 (1933). The Statement was approved by the Executive Council of the American
Bankers Association in 1933 and was incorporated into the Banker's Code of Fair
Competition. It deals principally with the responsibilities of a trust institution in
the actual administration of trust accounts and lays down normative standards con-
cerning confidential relations with customers, "disinterestedness" and fidelity in trust
administration, and the general exercise of care and skill. Ibid. See Jackson, The
Establishment of Cordial Relations Between the Bar and the Corporate Fiduciaries,
5 LAiW & CONTEMP. PROB. 80, 82 (1938). See generally Harris, Code of Ethics for
Trustmen, 103 TRUSTS & ESTATES 1186 (1964).
" The interests of the fiduciary and the grantor are divergent and conflicting as
to the issues of fees, duration of the relationship, and the fiduciary's duty of care.
43 MINN. L. REv. 827, 830 (1959). More particularly, "at times the best interests of
the testator are served by an outright disposition of his estate, but then there are
no trustee's fees. Circumstances might make it desirable that there be two trustees,
but in that event the company would have to share fees with another. It is often
in the client's interest that the trust be of short duration, but those which endure
over a long period of years are most profitable to the fiduciary. The client's interest
might demand that the powers of the trustee be rather limited, but the company
wants them as broad as possible. It is in the interest of the trust company that a
provision be inserted making it liable only for actual misfeasance or gross negli-
gence, while the client's interest might demand that the trustee be held to a high
degree of care." Hicks & Katz, supra note 25, at 82.
a3 See Johnstone, supra note 25, at 34-35. It is also worthy of note at this point
that one of the factors to be considered by the Comptroller of the Currency in decid-
ing to approve or reject a national bank's application for authorization to exercise
fiduciary power, see note 7 supra, is the "nature of the supervision to be given to
the fiduciary activities, including the qualifications, experience and character of the
proposed officer or officers of the trust department." 12 C.F.R. § 9.3 (e) (Supp. 1966)
(fiduciary powers of national banks and collective investment funds). For state regu-
lation of banks and trust companies in Ohio, see generally OHIO REv. CODE ANN.
§§ 1111.01-.99 (Page 1954), as amended, Onto REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1111.02-.28 (Page
Supp. 1965).
To guarantee an adequate measure of skill and expertise in many occupations
and professions states have erected educational and training barriers in the form of
licensing requirements. The banking profession is not subject to this type of control.
See Occupational Licensing in the States, 25 STATE Gov'T 275, 276 (1952).
34MNN. L. REv. 827, 831 (1959); 33 U. CINC. L. REv. 401, 415 (1964);
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many trust companies and banks of at least some attorneys as trust
personnel35 may contribute further to an assurance of a competent
and ethical estate practice by these institutions. 6
Nevertheless, although several, "built-in" safeguards may thus
be identified, it is also evident that they do not derive from any
standards uniformly applied or adhered to in the trust-business com-
munity but rather from the individual, voluntary practices of each
trust institution. The existence and vitality of these safeguards may
be expected to vary considerably from case to case, leaving the pub-
lic to determine at its peril the reliability of estate planning services
offered by banks and trust companies.
Even assuming, therefore, that trust institutions may and do
furnish improvident or self-serving advice, it remains to inquire
more particularly into the likelihood and the manner of harm to the
trust customer. Ordinarily, his interests will be protected by his
attorney who must be consulted for the drafting of any legal docu-
ment needed to implement the estate plan;37 standard procedure
calls for participation of the attorney even earlier-in the discus-
sion stage with the bank and prospect. What frequently happens,
however, is that the bank recommends an attorney if the prospect
has no special preference of his own; such an attorney is subjected
to subtle pressures to draw up or accede to the general kind of
estate plan desired by the bank, so as to be called upon for these
services in the future.38 To the extent that the attorney is not
107 U. PA. L. Rav. 398, 401 (1959). See McFarland, Marketing Trust Services, 103
TRUST & EStATES 1132, 1133 (1964). On the other hand, a small estate-planning
corporation may be less likely to be concerned about its community standing or
reputation and therefore not feel the pinch of this prophylactic, "market place"
pressure.
35 See, e.g., Hamilton, The Necessity for Excellence, 98 TRusrs & ESTATES 1201
(1959).
Be The actual value of this assurance would appear to be only marginal. The
trust customer may have no dealings at all with a bank attorney, as where the
latter is assigned background legal work for the trust department. And if a trust
officer uses the attorney's product in advising a trust customer, there is an un-
authorized practice of law violation. If, instead, the attorney does deal directly with
the trust department's customers, they are still prevented from receiving the benefit
of his professional competence: any communication of legal advice would again
subject the trust institution to punishment for practicing law and would further
subject the attorney to disciplinary proceedings for breaching his duty of undivided
loyalty and for permitting the intervention of a controlling, lay intermediary between
himself and his client. See American Bar Association, Canons of Professional Ethics
6, 35; ABA OPINIONS 3-7, 33-35.
'1 See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
"8These competitive pressures are accentuated by the policy of some banks of
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genuinely independent, there is a substantial risk that the prospect
will not be given the disinterested counsel to which he is entitled.3 9
Another potential source of harm consists in the possibility that
the prospect, though not embarking on a full-fledged estate-arrange-
ment program, may act himself and to his detriment on certain rec-
ommendations contained in the analysis report, as by writing a
holographic will" or by changing the beneficiary on an insurance
policy.41 Even if the prospect consults an attorney, there is the
danger that he will do so begrudgingly, undesirous of incurring the
expense of counsel fees, and at the sole behest of the bank. Armed
with an estate plan drawn out in some detail and a preconceived
notion of the attorney as a necessary evil, the prospect may resist
development of a healthy attorney-client relationship42 and insist
that all he needs is the preparation of instruments to implement the
bank's estate plan.43 The attorney will then either refuse to perform
this scrivener's task, leaving the prospect with the problem of find-
ing a lawyer willing to be a mere draftsman; or he may proceed to
formulate an estate plan within the limitations imposed by an un-
retaining the attorney who prepared the instrument to represent the corporate
executor or trustee.
The joint bank-bar Statement of Principles stipulates that a bank, when requested
by a customer to recommend a lawyer for the legal work entailed in setting up a
trust or estate, should submit several names of competent attorneys without special
comment. National Conference Group, supra note 3, at 190A (approved by the
American Banker's Association and the American Bar Association in 1941). This
rule would enable a bank in this situation to suggest attorneys known to be capable
in .the complex estate planning field and to avoid the waste of effort and time
resulting when a lawyer unfamiliar with the intricacies of estate law is brought in.
However, it does not obviate the tendency among those lawyers competing for this
business to advise nomination of the bank as corporate fiduciary and other estate
features which may not always be in the best interest of the client-trust customer.
"Not only may an attorney cater to the bank's position to enhance his competi-
tive standing, but he may also rely heavily on the estate formula already worked out
by the bank, failing to perform the task of independent research, analysis, and formu-
lation which it is his office to perform. Both, then, in terms of excess deference and
reliance an attorney may default in his duty of providing independent counsel.
10A holographic will satisfying the requirements for a valid testamentary instru-
ment will be admitted to probate. E.g., In re Smith's Will, 27 Ohio Op. 520 (P. Ct.
Tuscarawas County 1944).
" Other examples of "self-help" by the prospect would include the making of an
inter vivos gift and the changing of the form of a bank account.
,2A cooperative, and even congenial, relationship between the attorney and client
is especially important in this estate practice area since a good estate plan must be
based on full disclosure by the client of confidential business and family affairs and a
frank discussion of what the client would like to do with his property. See TRACHT-
MAN, op. cit. supra note I, at 3-5.
," See 39 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 364, 368 (1964).
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co-operative client." In neither case is the interest of the prospect
adequately protected.
An interest receiving less overt emphasis but one which must
be of substantial concern to the bar in its unauthorized practice
campaign in this area is that of the legal profession itself.48 To
dispose the public favorably toward its trust services and induce
patronage, a bank or trust company advertises; not infrequently this
solicitation will include, among other things, affirmations concern-
ing the willingness and ability of the institution to give estate plan-
ning advice.48 To permit these institutions to advertise their "legal"
competence while precluding attorneys from doing so not only un-
dercuts the effectiveness of the prohibition itself but places the
lawyer at a distinct competitive disadvantage. 47 In addition, it tends
to be destructive of the professional tenor of this legal service by
accentuating the aspects of financial gain and economic rivalry.48
The actual monetary loss suffered by the bar may be minimal due
to the countervailing increase in the demand for the lawyer's draft-
"See note 42 supra. Additionally, the prospect may request only a limited service
from the attorney, such as the preparation of documents for the exercise of a power
of appointment. The attorney, not fully apprised of the prospect's objective (to
effectuate tax savings on the basis of the estate scheme recommended by the bank)
may fail to assess the tax consequences to the prospect of legal acts requested in the
broader context of this objective. As a result of his reliance on the bank's report,
the prospect may thus be led into a hazardous tax position.
" See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
"8 The Statement of Principles on estate planning adopted by the National Con-
ference Group prohibits any trust institution from directly or impliedly offering to
give legal advice or inviting the public by means of advertising to bring their legal
problems to it. National Conference Group, supra note 3, at 191A. The fact that
this has been a recurrent problem is shown by the complaints received by the
National Conference Group of careless and inadvertent violations of this advertising
restriction, necessitating some further statement of policy concerning advertising. Ibid.
,7 Solicitation of professional employment by direct or indirect means is for-
bidden an attorney. American Bar Association, Canon of Professional Ethics 27. See
ABA OPINIONS 19-25; DRINKER, op. cit. supra note 30, at 210-73.
"[I]t would be futile to try to protect the parties by prohibiting lawyers from
soliciting legal work, and, at the same time, to tolerate such solicitation by the
wholly unqualified practitioner. Moreover, the public would not be protected if
this prohibition were circumvented by permitting corporations, laymen and lay
agencies to claim legal competence in this field at the very same time that lawyers
are forbidden to advertise .. " American Bar Association Committee on the Un-
authorized Practice of Law, Informative Opinion 1961-A: Pension and Profit Sharing
Planning, 47 A.B.A.J. 1133, 1135 (1961). See Riggs, Unauthorized Practice and the
Public Interest: Arizona's Recent Constitutional Amendment, 37 So. CAL. L. RV. 1,
19 (1964).
"s See Note, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 126, 133 (1959); 107 U. PA. L. Rav. 398, 401-02 (1959).
See also Clark, The Effect of Unauthorized Practice of Law Upon the Ethics of the
Legal Profession, 5 LAw & CorEMP. PRos. 97, 99-100 (1938); Riggs, supra note 27, at
19 n.52.
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ing and even consultation services as more people become convinced
by the bank's salesmanship of the desirability of some form of estate
planning.49 However, there remains an intangible impairment to
the professionalism ideal deriving from the commercialization of
the practice of estate law occurring in the absence of judicially
imposed restraint.
The validity of the tests used in Green and related cases to
delineate the bounds of permissible estate practice depends ulti-
mately upon how well each is gauged to identify and safeguard
against these various injuries to the public and the legal profession.
The "specific information" approach adopted by the Ohio Supreme
Court is grounded upon the reasonable premise that the oppor-
tunity for misapprehending and mishandling the relevant substan-
tive law is much greater when the trust officer has the responsibility
of making specific suggestions about the management and disposi-
tion of an estate than when he is confined to speaking in generali-
ties. His conflict of interest also becomes more intense when an at-
tempt is made to fill in, even tentatively, the features of an actual
estate plan by an analysis service embodying specific advice. 50 Most
important, this potential harm is likely to become actualized since
the recipient of the estate information will be more inclined to act
on his own in reliance when it is "spelled out" and tailored to fit
his particular circumstances. As to the potential problem of the
prospect's attorney who may not be entirely "independent" of the
bank,5 ' the specificity of the bank's estate analysis has little or no
relation to the existence of a tacit and mutually advantageous
understanding between an outside attorney and a trust officer; 52 on
the other hand, it is true that the less specific the bank's recommen-
dations are, the less likely it is that the attorney will defer without
0 This point was made by the bank in Green. 4 Ohio St. 2d at 82, 212 N.E.2d
at 588. The court admitted the soundness of the proposition but concluded that it
was inapposite to the question in issue, that is, whether the estate analysis program
constituted the practice of law. Ibid.
50It is precisely the point at which estate advice becomes specific in relation to
a particular client's circumstances that the trust officer must decide such matters
as whether to recommend a corporate or individual trustee, or even a trust form of
property disposition in the first instance, what duration the trust should assume,
what the powers and duties of the trustee should be. All of these choices involve an
inherent conflict of interest. See note 32 supra.
"1See notes 38-39 supra and accompanying text.
"It is difficult to conceive of a compact test which would encompass this un-
desirable modus operandi along with other estate planning dangers. The court in
Green, however, did not address itself to, or even take note of, this problem.
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reaching conclusions on his own. Finally, the threat to the profes-
sional integrity of the bar55 may be vitiated to some extent by the
court's injunction which, by forbidding the bank from representing
itself as capable of providing specific legal information, should have
the practical effect of eliminating solicitation as to the legal service
of estate planning.54
The other tests in use in this area do not appear to be well
adapted to service as meaningful rules of thumb. Ill-considered ad-
vice from a trust officer is as inimical to the public when it consti-
tutes a major item of business as when it is supplemental. Hence,
the "incidental services" criterion lacks relevance to the predomi-
nant interest for the protection of which unauthorized practice
restrictions exist.55  Similarly, while the receipt of some direct or
indirect economic benefit by a layman for giving legal advice as
contemplated by the compensation criterion may be an additional
affront to the lawyer, it does not appear to have any relation to the
likelihood of harm accruing to the trust customer.50
The definitional approach focusing on the "application of legal
principles in more than an insubstantial way" shares a basic similar-
ity in impact with the Green test, since such an application is surely
involved in a reporting of specific legal information. 7 Depending
r See note 48 supra and accompanying text.
6'4 Ohio St. 2d at 79-80, 84-85, 212 N.E.2d at 586-87, 589-90. This prohibition
would also help to equalize any competitive disadvantage thought to exist by reason
of the advertising opportunities open to the bank but not to an attorney. See note
47 supra and accompanying text. This same effect could be produced if bar associa-
tions were permitted vigorously to advertise the legal profession, with emphasis on
the necessity for employment of competent legal counsel. Greene, Administration of
Trusts-Unauthorized Practice of Law by Banks, 82 CONN. B.J. 428, 428-29 (1958).
See Johnstone, supra note 25, at 36-42.
"For this reason, "incidental services" has been rejected as a determinative test
in other unauthorized practice areas. See, e.g., Gardner v. Conway, 234 Minn. 468,
479-80, 48 N.W.2d 788, 795-96 (1951). The Green case shows that when advice of a
legal complexion becomes specific in relation to a particular estate, the fact that it
may be characterized as incidental, see Brief for Appellant, pp. 3-6, will not cure
the unauthorized practice violation.
"Wrong legal advice by a layman is equally injurious whether given for or
without consideration or compensation." Grievance Comm. v. Coryell, 190 S.W.2d
180, 181 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945). Accord, State ex rel. Wright v. Barlow, 131 Neb.
294, 296-97, 268 N.W. 95, 96 (1936); Grievance Comm. v. Dean, 190 S.W.2d 126, 129
(rex. Civ. App. 1945).
'5 The Ohio court in Green quoted with approval language from the Oregon case
which set out the "application of legal principles" concept. 4 Ohio St. 2d at 82,
212 N.E.2d at 588. The Oregon court in applying that concept commented that
while an insurance salesman could explain to a prospective customer various ways
of disposing of a person's assets generally and in general terms the tax savings avail-
able from life insurance, he ordinarily could not lawfully "advise a prospective
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on the interpretation given by a court to the word "insubstantial,"
the substantiality test may be more restrictive than the Green crite-
ria, extending to cover and prohibit even general estate analysis
comments. 5 To the extent of the concurrence in incidence of the
two tests, the same considerations validating the Green formula
should confirm the other, broader one. However, the "specific in-
formation" test can be adjudged the more useful of the two. As a
practical guide, it is easier for the trust officer to abide by in terms
of his actual negotiations with a prospective customer;59 and as a
judicial referent, this standard is perhaps less amorphous than the
"application of legal principles" concept.
While the court in Green did employ an unauthorized practice
criterion possessing a measure of validity, the court's opinion is less
than satisfactory. Even a summary explication of the particular in-
jurious consequences' ° of the bank's program was absent. The court
disposed of the issue in litigation simply by determining that the
estate analysis fell within its definition of the practice of law." A
more useful line of inquiry would have been to consider whether,
regardless of formal characterization, the challenged practices had
such a detrimental effect on valued interests to justify interdiction.
The mechanical, definitional approach used by the court also fails
to assess the magnitude and prevalence of any existing harmful
purchaser with respect to his specific need for life insurance as against some other
form of disposition of his estate .... ." Oregon State Bar v. John H. Miller & Co.,
235 Ore. 341, 347, 385 P.2d 181, 183 (1963). (Emphasis in original.)
18 But see id. at 344-45, 385 P.2d at 182, where the court, in discussing its "applica-
tion of legal principles" test, admitted that "frequently advice given in the course of
carrying on a business is shaped by a knowledge of the applicable law .... [But] the
legal ingredient in the advice may be so insubstantial as to call for the application of
the principle of de minimis non curat lex." (Emphasis added.) It was the planning of
a person's estate which utilized the law in more than an insubstantial way. Ibid. Com-
pare' 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 364, 866-67 (1964).
"To require a trust officer to refrain from giving "specific legal information in
relation to the specific facts of a particular person's estate," 4 Ohio St. 2d at 79, 80,
212 N.E.2d at 586-87 (the full statement of the "specific information" test), is to
delineate a reasonably workable standard differentiating lay estate practice from
legal practice. The only problem which may arise would involve a trust officer's use
of hypothetical examples and analogous situations as a means of conveying to a
customer specific information relevant to the laiter's estate condition without peak-
ing directly about his particular estate. Much of the advice and information in the
bank's estate analysis report in Green was apparently of this character, and while
the court of appeals explicitly approved the use of "illustrative examples" of estate
problems, it found the bank's suggestions objectionable as transgressing the bounds
of "reasonable circumspection." 3 Ohio App. 2d at 69-70, 209 N.E.2d at 233.
" See text accompanying notes 31-49 supra.
614 Ohio St. 2d at 80-81, 212 N.E.2d at 587.
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effects, a consideration which would seem pivotal when equitable
relief in the form of an injunction is sought.02 Since strained rela-
tions between the bar and lay group defendants are likely to be
engendered by this kind of litigation, it is essential that courts not
only clearly articulate the standards they are applying but also fully
explore the policy justifications for their decisions. A frank and full
judicial treatment of an unauthorized practice problem is more
likely to obtain the respect of the public and lay groups involved
than a superficial or mechanistic resolution, which may be inter-
preted as an attempt by judges to preserve the profitable business of
the legal profession against impregnation. Moreover, it is only upon
a foundation of respect for the formulae worked out by the courts
that the most effective and desirable means of dealing with the
issue of unauthorized practice-voluntary self-restraint by laymen
and lay institutions operating on the fringe of legal practice and
by their customers-can be established.
An evaluation of the judicial result obtained in Green should
consider not only the extent of protection it affords the public but
also its impact on the public's fundamental need for qualified and
reasonably priced services. In the estate planning context, the ques-
tion is not so much who will provide the planning and advisory
services exclusively63 but rather how the lawyer and the trust officer
62 For example, one might contend that so drastic a sanction as a permanent
injunction is unwarranted here. The possibility that a trust customer might act on
one of the few recommendations tentatively advanced in the estate analysis report
which could be effectuated without the insulating intervention of an outside attorney,
is arguably only tangential. This possibility and the undocumented charge of the
occasional existence of a latent, self-serving "coalition" between the bank and an
outside attorney recommended by it which would work to the detriment of the
client-customer, may be thought insufficient grounds on which to justify curtailment
of the bank's established operations. Any alleged detraction from the professional
status of legal services threatened by the bank's solicitation program might be dis-
missed as too subtle or remote a consideration to merit any persuasive effect.
63 In other unauthorized practice areas, when the bar is successful in obtaining
an injunction against a lay defendant, it delimits the range of services which the
latter may market and places them within the exclusive domain of the legal pro-
fession. By so doing, the bar necessarily incurs a heightened responsibility to respond
to the public's need for these services with at least comparable expertise and for
fees which are not exorbitant. The general lack of sympathy for the bar's efforts
to restrict the practice of law to the licensed, see Note, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 126, 134
(1959), may be partly attributable to a feeling that it has not always succeeded in
sustaining this responsibility. See generally Hamner, Title Insurance Companies and
the Practice of Law, 14 BAYLOR L. Ray. 384 n.1 (1962), for discussion of the over-
whelming voter approval in Arizona of a constitutional amendment referendum
reversing, in effect, an Arizona Supreme Court decision forbidding title companies
from drafting certain legal documents.
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will participate in a task in which both have legitimate interests and
in which the optimum result may be achieved by joint effort.6 The
practical consequence of the Green decision is to require an outside
attorney to be brought in almost at the beginning of the dealings
between the bank and its trust customer, with the bank then per-
mitted wide latitude in discussing legal problems with the attorney
and in proffering any legal advice concerning the customer's estate. 65
By thus permitting the bank and the bar each to pursue its respec-
tive calling in estate and fiduciary practice without unreasonable
interference or pre-emption by the other while at the same time
furnishing additional protection for the public, this result is a de-
sirable one.
01 See McLucas, Relations of Banks with the Bar, 30 UNAUTHORIZED PRACTIE
Naws 189, 197 (1964); National Conference Group, Statements of Principles with
Respect to the Practice of Law: Banks wzth Trust Functions, reprinted in 3 M~ARIN-
DALE-HuBBELL, LAw DIRE ToRY 190A, 191A (1966).
61 See 4 Ohio St. 2d at 83, 85, 212 N.E.2d at 588, 590.
